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AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE DETERMINANTS
OF RESEARCH JOINT VENTURE FORMATION*
Roberto Herna¨n,{ Pedro L. MarIè n{ and Georges Siotis}
This paper empirically analyses the determinants of ¢rm participation
in Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). A review of the theoretical
literature highlights the di¤culty of identifying testable hypotheses.
Using a large database of European RJVs, we estimate a participation
equation at the ¢rm level using the logit procedure. We ¢nd that
sectorial R&D intensity, industry concentration, ¢rm size, tech-
nological spillovers, and past RJV participation positively in£uence
the probability of forming RJVs. By contrast, patents' e¡ectiveness
reduce the likelihood of RJV formation. Last, country ¢xed e¡ects
suggest that ¢rms from larger countries are less likely to participate in
cross-border RJVs.
i. introduction
Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) are agreements whereby ¢rms decide
to share technological knowledge while, in principle, continuing to
compete against each other in the product market. The aim of this paper is
empirically to identify the ¢rm and industry characteristics that determine
RJV formation.
Recent theoretical contributions have highlighted the complex mech-
anisms that underlie RJV participation. First, RJVs involve the
internalisation of technological spillovers and R&D cost-sharing, as well
as the assimilation of knowledge that may be of strategic importance
(Kamien, MÏller and Zang [1992]). Second, the degree of size-related
asymmetries between ¢rms in£uences participation decisions (Petit and
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Towlinsky [1999]). Third, the research paths (complementary versus sub-
stitute R&D) a¡ect the incentives to form an RJV (Katsoulacos and Ulph
[1998]). Finally, all these models show that strategic interactions in the
product market a¡ect the decision to participate in RJVs. This e¡ect may
be direct (depending on the degree of product market complementarity) or
indirect (e.g. when RJVs are simply used as a vehicle to enhance the
feasibility of product market collusion).1
The business literature provides additional and useful information
regarding RJV formation. It stresses that ¢rms have di¡erent `absorptive
capacities' of research results, which in turn determine their willingness to
form RJVs. The absorptive capacity of each ¢rm is determined by factors
such as size, past experience with research cooperation, corporate culture
and business line of activity (Kogut [1991]).
Last, speci¢c public policies towards RJVs have been developed. On
the one side, competition law determines the nature of inter-¢rm
cooperation that is legally accepted. On the other side, subsidies are
sometimes granted to encourage RJV creation, as these arrangements are
believed to have some socially bene¢cial characteristics, such as the
reduction in the duplication of R&D costs.
Given the complexity of the problem, empirical research has been
hampered by a two-fold constraint: lack of micro data, and the
unobservability of a number of key parameters highlighted by theoretical
models, such as the level of technological spillovers or di¡erences in
absorptive capacity across ¢rms. As a result, the empirical literature using
a structural approach is scarce. To the best of our knowledge, the only
contribution that overcomes some of these problems is that of RÎller,
Tombak and Siebert [1998]. They develop a duopoly model that contains
four ingredients: spillovers, R&D cost sharing, ¢rm asymmetries and
product market complementarities. They show that size symmetry and
product complementarity between ¢rms enhance the likelihood of RJV
formation. Note that their analysis focuses on the formation of pairs
between ¢rms that are known to have created an RJV. Thus, the question
they ask is: given that a ¢rm has decided positively on participation, which
partners does it choose? However, they do not address the issue of which
¢rms are more likely to decide on embarking in an RJV in the ¢rst place.
In this paper we attempt to ¢ll the gap between theory and empirical
testing by making use of a large ¢rm level data-set. The data pertains to
RJVs formed under the umbrella of the Eureka and EU Framework
1 Both in Europe and the US, the legal framework applicable to RJVs recognises that these
agreements might be used as a vehicle for collusion. For instance, in EU law, a distinction is
established between `concentrative' and `cooperative' joint ventures. See Neven, Papan-
dropoulos and Seabright [1998] for a thorough economic and legal analysis.
2
Programmes, both pan-European initiatives aimed at enhancing inter-¢rm
research cooperation. As a control group, we consider a much larger
sample of ¢rms that could potentially participate in these RJVs. Thus, we
are able to measure the e¡ect of the relevant ¢rm and industry characteris-
tics that in£uence RJV formation. We use the logit estimation procedure
as we can observe if the ¢rms under analysis decide or not to form an RJV
in a given period, but not their pro¢ts under these two alternative
scenarios.
We ¢nd that sectorial R&D intensity, industry concentration, ¢rm size,
technological spillovers, and past RJV participation positively in£uence
the probability of forming RJVs. By contrast, patents' e¡ectiveness reduce
the likelihood of RJV formation. Last, country ¢xed e¡ects suggest that
¢rms from larger countries are less likely to participate in cross-border
RJVs.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II describes
the data and how the variables are constructed and presents the empirical
speci¢cation, while Section III presents the econometric results.
ii. data, variable construction and econometric specification
II(i). The Data
The set of RJVs which are analysed in this paper are retrieved from the
`STEP to RJV' database, constructed as part of an EU ¢nanced TSER
project. These RJVs have been formed under the umbrella of either the
Eureka Programme or the EU Framework Programme for Science and
Technology (EU-FP in the remainder of the paper). Eureka was launched
in the mid-eighties as a pan-European initiative aimed at enhancing
cross-border technological cooperation. Obtaining the Eureka label does
not entitle ¢rms to EU subsidies, nor is Eureka an EU programme.
However, obtaining the Eureka `seal of approval' enhances ¢rms' ability
to receive subsidies from their respective national authorities. RJVs
formed under EU-FP programmes are eligible for a subsidy, which varies
according to the nature of the project. Information on these projects has
been retrieved from CORDIS (an EU database which centralises
information on all EU ¢nanced projects in a raw format), and the Eureka
web page. Both programmes require participants to establish
transnational projects (i.e. RJVs involving ¢rms from only one country
are not eligible).
Our data set is constructed using three separate sources. First, we use 
data on individual Eureka and EU-FP RJVs. In both cases, we have a brief 
description of the project, a sectorial acronym, and the name of the 
participating ¢rms. Some projects were launched in the mid eighties, but 
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the bulk of them were initiated in the nineties. We have data on RJVs until
1996.2
Table I depicts the total number of projects involving a ¢rm from a
given country, the geographical origin of ¢rms participating in RJVs, and
the average number and percentage of ¢rms of the same nationality
participating in a given project. The data pertains to projects covering the
period 1986^1996.
There is a high correlation between number of projects, average number
and percentage of participants of the same nationality, and country size.
This should come as no surprise; nonetheless, some interesting patterns
emerge. For instance, while German and French ¢rms appear keen to
participate in EU-FP projects, many of these cooperations involve
compatriot ¢rms. This tendency is even more marked for Eureka, since the
¢gure is larger for Eureka than EU-FP for almost all countries. This may
be taken as an indication that despite the programmes' declared objective
of fostering pan-European cooperation, many of the projects are still
predominantly national. Firms of non-EU origin tend to be keener to
participate in Eureka. This is the case of Norway, Switzerland, Poland,
Sweden, and Finland (the latter two countries were still not part of the
EU). Last, the average size of EU-FP projects is larger (7.15 ¢rms per
project) compared to Eureka projects (5.89 ¢rms).
Throughout the construction of the sample, we used a four-digit
sectorial breakdown. It would have been preferable to work at eight digits,
but some of the data were not available at such a ¢ne level of aggregation.
The nomenclature used is that of the British Central Statistical O¤ce
(CSO).
A word is in order on the composition of these RJVs. While some RJVs
in our sample are clearly vertical (involving business units in di¡erent
sectors), most of them involve at least two ¢rms operating in the same
market segment. Table II provides the sectorial a¤liation of participating
¢rms. As can be readily seen, ¢rms belonging to the information tech-
nology and aerospace clusters represent the most important contingent.
This is followed by environmental and energy technologies.
Table III provides information on the number of participants by project.
In the case of EU-FP projects, the distribution is fairly even, with a peak
for projects containing four to seven participants. By contrast, Eureka
projects involve, on average, fewer participants.
2 Our data does not contain all European RJVs, as some of them may take place outside
the framework of the EU-FP or Eureka. We are nonetheless con¢dent that our sample
contains the bulk of cross-border RJVs. The reason is the following: once the costs of
establishing a cross-border cooperation have been incurred, the additional outlays associated
with gaining an EU subsidy, or the Eureka seal, are minimal. By contrast, the gains are
important, as they may involve substantial subsidies.
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Table I
RJV Participation by Country
EU Framework Programme Eureka
Projects Firms Average no. of % of local Projects Firms Average no. of % of local
local ¢rms per ¢rms per local ¢rms per ¢rms per
Country No. % No. % projecta projectc No. % No. % projecta projectc
Austria 264 6.8 167 1.7 1.25 22.2 122 11.8 154 3.7 1.80 29.9
Belgium 872 22.5 482 4.9 1.48 22.9 127 12.3 141 3.4 1.47 28.2
Czech Republic 5 0.1 5 0.1 1.00 ö 24 2.3 27 0.7 1.58 29.4
Denmark 632 16.3 335 3.4 1.43 23.9 129 12.5 128 3.1 1.49 34.5
Finland 393 10.1 190 1.9 1.35 18.7 120 11.7 160 3.9 2.15 37.1
France 2,196 56.7 1,490 15.3 2.05 26.5 362 35.1 653 15.8 2.82 38.2
Germany 2,313 59.7 1,695 17.4 2.02 27.1 364 35.3 604 14.6 2.54 35.9
Greece 840 21.7 367 3.8 1.49 23.6 33 3.2 38 0.9 1.76 20.8
Hungary 9 0.2 9 0.1 1.22 3.5 38 3.7 41 1.0 1.47 28.4
Iceland 19 0.5 20 0.2 1.47 17.5 9 0.9 19 0.5 2.22 28.2
Ireland 487 12.6 207 2.1 1.27 21.3 18 1.7 17 0.4 1.06 0.6
Italy 1,653 42.7 1,025 10.5 1.78 26.6 186 18.1 279 6.7 2.32 30.0
Luxembourg 37 1.0 28 0.3 1.11 19.5 8 0.8 10 0.2 1.25 22.9
Netherlands 1,217 31.4 631 6.5 1.54 20.8 276 26.8 366 8.8 1.82 36.7
Norway 288 7.4 155 1.6 1.33 19.0 130 12.6 176 4.3 2.02 37.7
Poland 12 0.3 15 0.2 1.33 10.9 17 1.7 23 0.6 1.65 27.4
Portugal 558 14.4 292 3.0 1.38 22.3 64 6.2 80 1.9 1.91 38.9
Spain 1,170 30.2 773 7.9 1.61 27.5 218 21.2 307 7.4 1.84 38.2
Sweden 656 16.9 313 3.2 1.38 17.8 179 17.4 206 5.0 1.53 25.4
Switzerland 373 9.6 165 1.7 1.23 14.4 173 16.8 261 6.3 2.43 43.1
United Kingdom 2,315 59.8 1,381 14.2 1.85 25.5 261 25.3 448 10.8 2.39 36.6
Europe 3,874 100.0 9,745 100.0 7.15b 99.7 1,030 100.0 4,138 100.0 5.89 96.7
Note: a This average ¢gure is computed for projects where at least one ¢rm from this country is involved.
b In this case, local means European. Accordingly, this ¢gure represents average number of ¢rms per project.
c This percentage is de¢ned as the mean value of the percentage of other partners in each project that are from the same country.
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The second source of information pertains to participating ¢rms. We
retrieved this data from Amadeus, a database produced by Bureau Van
Dijk, a specialist provider of ¢rm-level data based on balance sheet
information. In the version of the database that we used, the total number
of entries exceeds 200,000 ¢rms, with detailed information on ownership
structure, and a ¢ne sectorial a¤liation (up to 8 digits). Geographical
coverage pertains to Europe (including Central and Eastern Europe). To
our knowledge, Amadeus is the most comprehensive source of ¢rm level
data in Europe. Since its launch, this database has been used quite
extensively in academic circles (see for instance, Filer and Hanousek
[2002] for an overview, or Bureau van Dijk's web page, www.bvdny.com).
Table II
Distribution of Projects by Technological Area
Technological area No. of RJVs %
Information 1,229 26
Aerospace 892 19
Energy 511 11
Environment 436 9
Agriculture 387 8
Education/Training 282 6
Medical and Biotechnology 263 6
Robotics/Production automation 172 4
Measurement methods 142 3
Transport 141 3
Electronics/Microelectronics 118 2
New materials 112 2
Communications 43 1
Lasers 26 1
Total 4,754 100
Table III
Distribution of Projects by Number of Participants
No. of participants
EU Framework
Programme Eureka Total
3 or less 546 14% 439 43% 985 20%
4 or 5 1,048 27% 249 24% 1,297 26%
6 or 7 977 25% 151 15% 1,128 23%
8 to 10 732 19% 78 8% 810 17%
11 to 15 391 10% 64 6% 455 9%
16 or more 180 5% 50 5% 230 5%
Total 3,874 100% 1,031 100% 4,905 100%
We retrieved the relevant information on ¢rms that appear both in 
Amadeus and in our RJV database, and dropped ¢rms which had formed 
EU-FP or Eureka RJVs, but for which no data was available in Amadeus. 
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We retrieved unconsolidated balance sheets in order to make use of data
pertaining to the relevant business establishment. We have been extremely
careful in identifying the relevant business unit, as many conglomerates
participate in these RJVs.3
Given that information on business units and industry characteristics
only span the period 1991^1996, and that some of the independent
variables may be endogenous to the model, we construct our dependent
variable for the period 1995^96.4 This allows us to deal with possible issues
of endogeneity by using lagged values for the independent variables (i.e.
pre-1995 values). The sample of ¢rms that had formed an EU-FP or
Eureka RJV during the period 1995^1996 yields a total of 1222 obser-
vations. We could gather the relevant ¢rm and industry level variables for
798 of them, and thus dropped the remaining 424 observations.
As mentioned above, it is necessary to form a control group with ¢rms
that have not joined an RJV during the period under study. We assume
that Amadeus is a fair representation of the true universe, and use the
entire Amadeus database as a control group. In some cases, entries in
Amadeus are incomplete, and variables are sometimes missing (e.g.,
number of employees). The sample for which we could gather all the
relevant information yields a total of 54610 observations (of which 798
have formed one or more EU-FP or Eureka RJV during the period
1995^96).
The third source of information we use is the Worldscope database.
The latter provides R&D expenditures for about 1500 large ¢rms. The
data is available for the period 1991^1996 at the SIC four digit level of
aggregation, which we converted into their CSO equivalent using detailed
conversion tables. This allowed us to construct R&D intensity at the four
digit level.
II(ii). Variables and Econometric Speci¢cation
We need to construct a set of variables that measure or proxy the
determinants of RJV formation identi¢ed in the theoretical models, and
explicitly spell out testable hypotheses. More precisely, we need measures
pertaining to ¢rm size, concentration, industry R&D intensity, and
industry speci¢c proxies for the extent of spillovers and the e¡ectiveness of
intellectual property rights protection. In addition, for some ¢rms,
willingness to join an RJV may be in£uenced by past experience with
RJVs. This may re£ect the success or failure of past ventures, the existence
3 The presence of large, multi-product ¢rms, poses a problem. Suppose that ABB parti-
cipates in an RJV in semi-conductors. The relevant business units are the ABB subsidiaries
that appear with this product as their main business line at the four-digit level. The con-
solidated, worldwide accounts of the ABB group would be inappropriate here.
4 Throughout the remainder of the text, one period refers to two years.
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of once-for-all ¢xed costs associated with RJV formation, as well as a
learning process in achieving successful cooperation. Last, the origin of
¢rms may introduce a country speci¢c e¡ect. Indeed, it seems that national
idiosyncracies in£uence the attitude of ¢rms towards formal cooperation
(Nelson [1993]).
To construct the variables, we take four digit sectors and Europe as
representing the relevant market. The variables that we include in the
regressions are as follows:
To control for di¡erences in the extent and magnitude of potential cost
reductions across industries, we include R&D intensity at the level of the
industry, calculated as total R&D expenditures over total sales, reported
by ¢rms belonging to that four-digit sector. We retrieved this data from
Worldscope, and we call this variable RDI. All else equal, costs reductions
resulting from a successful RJV will be more important in R&D intensive
industries, thus a¡ecting ¢rms' incentives to join in the ¢rst place. This
cost reduction e¡ects should positively in£uence ¢rms' willingness to form
an RJV.
To measure di¡erences in the importance of spillovers across industries,
we constructed two proxies. The ¢rst is based on data taken from Mans¢eld
[1985] which measures the speed at which innovationsöunwillinglyödi¡use
within an industry. It refers to both product and process innovation and is
measured as the average number of months before the di¡usion of an
innovation in the industry. The information is available at two to four digits,
depending on the industry. We assigned values for this variable accordingly
(for instance, in some sectors, we have a perfect correspondence; in others,
we assigned the value associated to the higher level of aggregation for which
the spillover variable was available). This variable acts as a proxy for the
`spillover lag', and we label it SPL. Another concurrent interpretation
pertaining to this variable is that it re£ects the importance of lead time in
R&D intensive industries. We expect this variable to appear with a negative
sign, since a slow di¡usion of innovations within an industry is indicative of
limited spillovers. The drawback is that data is only available for industries
that undertake R&D on a signi¢cant scale. Our sample also contains ¢rms
belonging to sectors not included in Mans¢eld's sample. For the sectors for
which no data is available, we have assigned the average value of the spillover
lag variable.5
5We also estimated our equations excluding the industries for which no data is available,
and the value and signi¢cance of the coe¤cient associated to SPL barely changed. With the
entire sample, we also included a dummy equal to one for industries for which no spillover
information is available, and zero otherwise. The dummy proved not signi¢cant, and the other
coe¤cients were not a¡ected by this inclusion. Last, we estimated our regressions excluding
SPL and the results remained identical for the remaining variables. All of the above indicates
that our results are not driven by this coding choice. See the Journal's website for these
regressions.
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The second proxy is built using the data reported by Levin, Klevorick,
Nelson and Winter [1987] that measures the e¡ectiveness of patents in
eighteen industrial sectors (both product and process). We expect `patent
e¡ectiveness' (denoted PATEF ) to appear with a negative sign, as ¢rms
that operate in sectors where patents are e¡ective do not need to rely on
RJVs in order to internalise spillovers. E¡ective patents ensure that
innovators can successfully protect their intellectual property rights, thus
driving unintended leakages (spillovers) to zero. As is the case with the
data reported by Mans¢eld [1985], there are some sectors for which this
particular variable is not available. We adopted the strategy described
above, and assigned the average value of this variable to sectors for which
data is missing.6 Note that, while both these proxies (SPL and PATEF )
are related to spillovers, the original sources of information are quite
distinct.
In the case of an asymmetric oligopoly, internalisation of spillovers via
RJV formation is greater the smaller the number of rivals in that industry
segment. In order to measure market concentration, we constructed the
Hirschman-Her¢ndÌhl index (HHI ) for each four-digit sector present in
our sample. The value taken by the HHI is the average for the 1991^94
period. Note that this variable also generates information as to whether
¢rms join RJVs to reduce the toughness of actual or potential competition.
Both the spillover and market power motives predict a positive coe¤cient
on this variable.
To represent asymmetries across ¢rms, we introduce a measure of ¢rm
size, namely the natural logarithm of the number of employees for each
¢rm in our sample, that we denote logFS. This measure is fairly stable
over time. We have taken ¢rm level averages for the 1991^94 period.
According to most oligopoly models for homogeneous products, size
di¡erences within an industry re£ect di¡erential e¤ciency.7 Also, if there
are ¢xed costs associated with forming RJVs (such as paper work and/or
the establishment of speci¢c facilities), large ¢rms may be more willing to
join, as they can spread these costs across a larger volume of sales. In
addition, size is likely to be highly correlated with `absorptive capacity',
thus increasing the likelihood to join. Last, it may be the case that size
may in£uence the public authority responsible for these programmes. This
may possibly result from exogenous preferences `for' or `against' big
business, or a process of regulatory capture. An alternative measure of
6 The comment made in the previous footnote regarding SPL also apply for PATEF, i.e.
the results are not sensitive to this coding choice.
7Most RJV models represent competition in the third stage of the game as quantity
Cournot competition. One of the basic results of the Cournot model is that ¢rms' market
share within the industry is inversely related to their marginal costs, i.e. directly related to
their e¤ciency.
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asymmetries is market share (denoted MS ), calculated as ¢rm over
industry size, both measured by the number of employees.
Practitioners and the business literature stress that some ¢rms are
keener to cooperate than others as a result of di¡erences such as corporate
culture. It is also stressed that experience or past participation in RJVs
may make it easier to repeat the experience (with the same group of ¢rms,
or new partners). We have thus constructed `quantitative' variables that
take into account the cumulated number of past participations in Eureka
and the EU Framework Programme for the period 1986^92, and label
these variables EXP-FP and EXP-EU. These variables also provides
information on the success of these programmes (in terms of ¢rms'
willingness to take part in them). We also include a set of dummies for the
country of origin of the ¢rm. The data will itself reveal whether geographic
origin is an important determinant behind the decision to form a project.
Last, the dependent variable takes value 1 if the business unit has
participated in at least one EU-FP or Eureka RJV initiated during the
period 1995^96, and 0 otherwise. Table IV reports the descriptive statistics
for all the variables that we used in the estimation.
The expression to be estimated can be written as:
1 PrRJVi;j;t  1  Fb0  b1RDIj;tÿ2  b2SPL j  b3PATEFj
 b4HHIj;tÿ2  b5 logFSi;tÿ2  b6MSi;tÿ2
 b7EXP-FPi;tÿ2  b8EXP-EUi;tÿ2 
XK
k1
gkCountryk;i
where F: is the logistic cumulative distributive function. The sub-indices
i; j; t and k, respectively denote ¢rm, sector, time, and country. We have
lagged our independent variables by two periods in order to mitigate the
endogeneity problem from our estimation. Since the residuals are likely to
be correlated within the industries, and especially given the industry level
Table IV
Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Prob(RJVi) 0 1
R&D Intensityj 0.02 0.02 0.0000125 0.1044
Spillover lagj 12.57 1.06 7.815 16.545
Patents e¡ectivenessj 3.95 0.30 2.95 5.70
HHIj 0.03 0.05 0.003 0.678
Firm sizei 321 2231 1 229161
Market Sharei 0.003 0.01 1.4
10ÿ6 0.817
Experiencei;EU-FP 0.03 0.64 0 62
Experiencei;Eureka 0.01 0.19 0 13
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variables (Moulton [1990]), our calculation of standard errors controls
for this correlation by clustering at the four-digit level.
iii. econometric results
Table V presents the results of estimating alternative speci¢cations for
expression 1 using the logit estimation technique and controlling for
residual correlation among observations from the same industry. The
estimation contains industry variables (R&D intensity, the spillover lag
and concentration), and ¢rms speci¢c variables (size and past participation
in Eureka and EU-FP projects). In Table V, we present the results
pertaining to six distinct speci¢cations. The purpose of this exercise is to
assess whether the results are sensitive to the exclusion or inclusion of
speci¢c variables. Last, in some regressions we include country dummies
whose point estimates are presented in Table VI. The Netherlands were
chosen as the reference country.
Table V
Econometric Results. Dependent Variable: Prob(RJVt  1)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant ÿ5.57
(6.98)
ÿ5.58
(7.07)
ÿ1.23
(1.50)
ÿ5.03
(6.76)
ÿ5.65
(6.53)
ÿ5.02
(6.44)
R&D Intensityj 17.43
(6.12)
17.42
(6.15)
22.94
(7.48)
13.33
(5.28)
17.80
(6.22)
14.08
(5.62)
Spillover lagj ÿ0.14
(2.24)
ÿ0.14
(2.24)
ÿ0.18
(2.65)
ÿ0.16
(2.73)
ÿ0.13
(2.16)
ÿ0.15
(2.67)
Patents
e¡ectivenessj
ÿ0.36
(2.70)
ÿ0.36
(2.68)
ÿ0.42
(3.43)
ÿ0.21
(1.65)
ÿ0.36
(2.39)
ÿ0.20
(1.47)
HHIj 2.40
(1.64)
2.41
(1.69)
3.09
(1.98)
2.08
(1.55)
2.37
(1.73)
2.07
(1.58)
Log (Firm size)i 0.73
(18.09)
0.74
(20.17)
0.54
(14.41)
0.81
(19.15)
0.61
(14.23)
Market Sharei 0.09
(0.07)
15.16
(6.58)
Experiencei,EU-FP 2.04
(12.50)
1.96
(12.31)
Experiencei,Eureka 0.81
(6.10)
0.75
(5.56)
Country dummies NO NO NO NO YES YES
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.19 0.10 0.32 0.22 0.34
Wald w2 (d.f.) 526.99 (6) 526.42(5) 163.46 (5) 526.45 (7) 831.28 (23) 801.86 (25)
Number of
observations
54610 54610 54610 54610 54188 54188
Note: t-statistics in absolute values in parentheses. 
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Table VI
Country Dummies Coefficient Estimates
Country dummies (5) (6)
Austria 0.12
(0.31)
0.27
(0.73)
Belgium ÿ0.04
(0.16)
ÿ0.21
(0.83)
Switzerland ÿ0.08
(0.23)
0.17
(0.48)
Germany ÿ0.57
(2.13)
ÿ0.79
(2.96)
Denmark 0.57
(2.53)
0.26
(1.16)
Spain ÿ0.66
(0.93)
ÿ1.11
(1.37)
Finland 0.61
(2.00)
0.53
(1.74)
France ÿ0.53
(2.01)
ÿ0.78
(3.07)
UK ÿ0.97
(3.85)
ÿ0.85
(3.52)
Greece 0.65
(2.00)
0.36
(1.12)
Ireland 0.07
(0.13)
0.00
(0.00)
Iceland 0.75
(0.69)
0.57
(0.50)
Italy ÿ0.54
(1.99)
ÿ0.71
(2.92)
Luxembourg ÿ0.19
(0.29)
ÿ0.30
(0.48)
Norway ÿ0.04
(0.10)
ÿ0.22
(0.65)
Portugal ÿ0.19
(0.58)
ÿ0.27
(0.76)
Sweden 0.05
(0.17)
0.10
(0.37)
Poland ÿ4.52
(4.57)
ÿ3.91
(3.92)
Note: These two columns correspond to regressions (5) and (6) in Table 5.
The Netherlands is the omitted country.
t-statistics in absolute values in parentheses.
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As expected, sectorial R&D intensity (RDI ) appears with a positive
sign, and it is signi¢cant at less than the 1% level. This re£ects the fact that
an RJV is an attractive option for projects involving large R&D outlays
because of the cost sharing element.
The point estimate associated with the spillover lag (SPL) is also
signi¢cant at the 1% or 5% levels, depending on the speci¢cation. This
indicates that RJVs are more likely to materialise in sectors where
technological knowledge di¡uses fast. The variable measuring patent
e¡ectiveness (PATEF; also signi¢cant at the 1% or 5% levels) con¢rms this
¢nding: when intellectual property rights are successfully protected by
patents, ¢rms have less of an incentive to engage in RJVs. As mentioned
previously, both variables are related to spillovers, but they each act as
proxies for quite distinct economic phenomena. The fact that both are
signi¢cant serves to emphasise that knowledge di¡usion is central to our
understanding of RJV formation.8
An industry's HHI re£ects the degree of concentration, or conversely,
the extent of fragmentation. The less fragmented is an industry, the easier
it is to identify the appropriate partners to form an RJV. In addition, a
more concentrated industry o¡ers greater scope for e¡ective internal-
isation of spillovers. The coe¤cient is positive and signi¢cant (at the 10%
level or less in most speci¢cations), lending support to the arguments
presented above. Note that while the variables SPL and PATEF act as
proxies for the presence of spillovers at the industry level, concentration
captures the potential for internalising them within an RJV.
The coe¤cient for the variable measuring ¢rm size (logFS ) is positive
and highly signi¢cant (well below the 1% level). There is a number of
(non-exclusive) explanations for this ¢nding. First, it may re£ect the fact
that, given the degree of concentration, large ¢rms prefer to form RJVs
with other large ¢rms to maximise spillover internalisation. RÎller et al.
[1998] provide theoretical results pointing in that direction. Second, this
may be an indication of signi¢cant ¢xed costs associated with RJV
formation, such as the establishment of speci¢c facilities (e.g. a new R&D
lab), or the administrative and negotiation e¡orts necessary to reach
agreement with partners and/or sponsoring organisations. Third, large
¢rms in an industry will have a strong incentive to participate in many
RJVs in order to monitor innovative activity in their segment (a
sophisticated form of `technology watch').9 Fourth, for inter-industry
RJVs (that is, RJVs which involve technological complementarity), ¢rms
will be keen to cooperate with the largestöand more e¤cientö¢rms in the
8 The results are robust to the introduction of one only of SPL and PATEF: each remains
negative and signi¢cant when entered alone, and the remaining coe¤cients barely change.
9 By de¢nition, the largest ¢rmsöwhich are also the technology leadersöhave most to lose
from the emergence of new, technologically advanced, rivals.
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complementary industry. Last, the positive coe¤cient associated with this
variable may re£ect an exogenous preference for `big business' on the part
of the sponsoring organisation, or a process of regulatory capture.10
As for market share (MS ), this variable is not signi¢cant, except when
¢rm size is excluded from the speci¢cation (see columns (1) and (3) of
Table V). This simply re£ects the fact that these two variables measure
pretty much the same thing: a ¢rm's absolute size versus its relative size.
We opted to maintain ¢rm size and drop market share for two reasons.
First, logFS  turned to be systematically more signi¢cant than MS when
these variables were entered on their own (and not in tandem). More
importantly, absolute size not only re£ects a ¢rm's position relative to its
competitors, but also indicates whether it is better placed to support the
¢xed outlays associated with the creation of an RJV.
The coe¤cients capturing past participations in Eureka or EU-FP
projects (EXP-FP and EXP-EU ) are signi¢cant at less than the 1% level in
both cases. There are two non-exclusive explanations for this ¢nding.
First, it may re£ect the fact that a large part of the ¢xed costs associated
with RJV formation have to be paid only once. Thus, having already
incurred these costs, ¢rms' marginal cost of launching a new venture may
very well be negligible. Second, the positive sign may be an indication that
there is an important learning process in achieving successful cooperation.
In addition, there is also the possibility that these variables capture the
e¡ect of unobserved determinants of RJV participation.
Table VI presents point estimates for the coe¤cients on the country
dummies. These estimates suggest that ¢rms originating in the larger EU
countries (Germany, France, UK, Italy, and to a lesser extent, Spain) are
less likely to participate in pan-European RJVs. This re£ects the fact that
large country ¢rms ¢nd it easier to ¢nd RJV partners within their own
borders. The other country dummy that is signi¢cantly negative is the
Polish one. Apart from country size, the lower propensity of Polish ¢rms
to participate in pan-European RJVs probably results from the relative
`isolation' of the Polish economy during the time period studied in this
paper. Three dummies are positive and `almost' signi¢cant (Finland,
Greece and Denmark), and all three relate to small countries, thus
mirroring the e¡ect identi¢ed above for the bigger economies.
Overall, the ¢t of the regressions is good, with a log-likelihood ratio that
is signi¢cant well below the 1% level, irrespective of the speci¢cation. The
pseudo-R2 are also satisfactory, reaching 0.34 in the most complete
speci¢cation.
The policy implications of these ¢ndings can be summarised as follows.
10 As it is necessary expand resources (e.g. lobbying) to achieve e¡ective capture, large ¢rms 
are typically in a better position to achieve these ends.
14
First, it emerges that competition authorities do well to monitor co-
operative agreements in research activities, as those are found in more
concentrated industries and mainly involve large ¢rms. Secondly, the sign
and signi¢cance of the `past experience' variables might indicate that ¢rms
appear as satis¢ed with RJVs, and it might also re£ect that there are
strong ¢xed costs and learning e¡ects associated with an RJV.
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